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Abstract—Digital image steganalysis, or the detection
of image steganography, has been studied in depth for
years and is driven by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
groups’, such as APT37 Reaper, utilization of stegano-
graphic techniques to transmit additional malware to
perform further post-exploitation activity on a compro-
mised host. However, many steganalysis algorithms are
constrained to work with only a subset of all possible
images in the wild or are known to produce a high
false positive rate. This results in blocking any suspected
image being an unreasonable policy. A more feasible policy
is to filter suspicious images prior to reception by the
host machine. However, how does one optimally filter
specifically to obfuscate or remove image steganography
while avoiding degradation of visual image quality in the
case that detection of the image was a false positive? We
propose the Deep Digital Steganography Purifier (DDSP), a
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) which is optimized
to destroy steganographic content without compromising
the perceptual quality of the original image. As verified by
experimental results, our model is capable of providing a
high rate of destruction of steganographic image content
while maintaining a high visual quality in comparison
to other state-of-the-art filtering methods. Additionally,
we test the transfer learning capability of generalizing
to to obfuscate real malware payloads embedded into
different image file formats and types using an unseen
steganographic algorithm and prove that our model can
in fact be deployed to provide adequate results.
Index Terms—Steganalysis, Deep Learning, Machine
Learning, Neural Networks, Steganography, Image Ste-
ganalysis, Information Hiding
I. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is the usage of an algorithm to embed
hidden data into files such that during the transferral
of the file only the sender and the intended recipient
are aware of the existence of the hidden payload [1].
In modern day applications, adversaries and Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) groups, such as APT37 Reaper
[2], commonly utilize these algorithms to hide the trans-
mission of shellcode or scripts to a compromised system.
Once the file is received, the adversary then extracts
the malicious payload and executes it to perform further
post-exploitation activity on the target machine. Due to
the highly undetectable nature of the current state-of-
the-art steganography algorithms, adversaries are able
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to evade defensive tools such as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) and/or Antivirus (AV) software which
utilize heuristic and rule-based techniques for detection
of malicious activity.
Modern steganalysis methods, or techniques devel-
oped to specifically detect steganographic content, uti-
lize analytic or statistical algorithms to detect traditional
steganography algorithms, such as Least Significant Bit
(LSB) steganography [3]. However, these methods strug-
gle to detect advanced steganography algorithms, which
embed data using unique patterns based on the content
of each individual file of interest. This results in high
false positive rates when detecting steganography and
poor performance when deployed, effectively making
it unrealistic to perform preventative measures such as
blocking particular images or traffic from being trans-
mitted within the network. Furthermore, image steganal-
ysis techniques are typically only capable of detecting
a small subset of all possible images, limiting them to
only detect images of a specific size, color space, or file
format.
To address these issues, the usage of steganography
destruction techniques can be used to provide a more
feasible policy to handling potential false alarms. Instead
of obstructing the transmission of suspicious images,
filtering said images to remove steganographic content
effectively making it unusable by potential adversaries
provides a simpler solution. However, traditional and
unintelligent steganographic filtering techniques result
in the additional issue of degrading image quality.
In this paper, we propose an intelligent image
steganography destruction model which we term Deep
Digital Steganography Purifier (DDSP), which utilizes
a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [4] trained
to remove steganographic content from images while
maintaining high perceptual quality. To the best of
our knowledge, our DDSP model removes the greatest
amount of steganographic content from images while
maintaining the highest visual image quality in com-
parison to other state-of-the-art image steganography
destruction methods detailed in Section II-A.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II will discuss the prior work in the image steganography
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purification domain, along with the background infor-
mation on GANs. The dataset used for evaluating our
image purification model will be presented in Section
III, followed by a detailed description of DDSP in
Section IV. The experimental results will be discussed
and analyzed in Section V. Finally the conclusion and
future works will be presented in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Work
Attacks on steganographic systems [5] have been an
active topic of research with differing objectives of either
completely removing hidden steganographic content or
slightly obfuscating the steganographic data to be unus-
able while avoiding significant degradation of file qual-
ity. Within the same realm of machine learning based
steganographic attacks, the PixelSteganalysis [6] method
utilizes an architecture based on PixelCNN++ [7] to
build pixel and edge distributions for each image which
are then manually removed from the suspected image.
The PixelSteganalysis method is experimented against
three steganographic algorithms, Deep Steganography
[8] a Deep Neural Network (DNN) based algorithm,
Invisible Steganography GAN (ISGAN) [9] a GAN
based algorithm, and the Least Significant Bit (LSB)
algorithm. The majority of other steganographic destruc-
tion techniques are based on non-machine learning based
methods which utilize various digital filters or wavelet
transforms [10–17]. While these approaches may appear
simple to implement and do not require training on a
dataset, they do not specifically remove artifacts and
patterns left by steganographic algorithms. Instead these
techniques look to filter out high frequency content,
which can result in image quality degradation due to
perceptual quality not being prioritized.
B. Super Resolution GAN
The application of GANs for removing stegano-
graphic content while maintaining high visual quality
draws inspiration from the application of GANs to the
task of single image super resolution (SISR). Ledig
et. al’s research [18] utilized the GAN framework to
optimize a ResNet [19] to increase the resolution of low
resolution images to be as visually similar as possible
to their high resolution counterparts. Their research
additionally detailed that using the GAN framework as
opposed solely to a pixel-wise distance loss function,
e.g. mean squared error (MSE), results in additional high
frequency texture detail to be recreated. They note that
using the MSE loss function alone results in images that
appear perceptually smooth due to the averaging nature
of their objective function. Instead, the authors optimize
a multi-objective loss function which is composed of
a weighted sum of the pixel-wise MSE as a content
loss and the adversarial loss produced by the GAN
framework to reconstruct the low and high frequency
detail, respectively.
III. DATA
To train our proposed model, we utilized the BOSS-
Base dataset [20] because it is used as a benchmark
dataset for numerous steganalysis papers. The dataset
contains 10,000 grayscale images of size 512x512 of
the portable gray map (PGM) format. The images were
preprocessed prior to training by converting to the JPEG
format with a quality factor of 95% and resizing to
256x256 dimensions. As seen in Figure 1, 4 different
steganography algorithms are used to embed payloads
into the 10,000 images. These algorithms (HUGO [21],
HILL [22], S-UNIWARD [23], and WOW [24]) are
a few state-of-the-art steganography algorithms which
are difficult to detect even by modern steganalysis al-
gorithms. These algorithms are open source and made
available by the Digital Data Embedding Laboratory of
Binghamton University [25]. For each of these steganog-
raphy algorithms, 5 different embedding rates, 10%,
20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%, were used with 10% being
the most difficult to detect, and 50% being the easi-
est to detect. This process created a total of 210,000
images consisting of 200,000 steganographic images,
and 10,000 cover images. The BOSSBase dataset was
then split into train and test sets using a train/test split
criterion of 75%/25%.
Fig. 1: Steganography dataset creation process
IV. DEEP DIGITAL STEGANOGRAPHY PURIFICATION
Deep Digital Steganography Purifier (DDSP) consists
of a similar architecture to SRGAN [18]. However in-
stead of using a large ResNet, DDSP utilizes a pretrained
autoencoder as the generator network in the GAN frame-
work to remove the steganographic content from images
without sacrificing image quality. The DDSP model can
be seen in Figure 2. The autoencoder is initially trained
using the MSE loss function and then fine tuned using
the GAN training framework. This is necessary because
Fig. 2: Deep Digital Steganography Purifier (DDSP)
Architecture
Fig. 3: Autoencoder Architecture
Fig. 4: Encoder Network Architecture
autoencoders are trained to optimize MSE which can
cause images to have slightly lower quality than the
original image due to the reasons discussed in Section
II-B. More detailed descriptions of the architectures are
discussed in the following sections.
A. Autoencoder Architecture
The residual autoencoder, seen in Figure 3, consists
of encoder and decoder networks. The encoder learns
to reduce the size of the image while maintaining as
much information necessary. The decoder then learns
how to optimally scale the image to its original size
while having removed the steganographic content.
1) Encoder Architecture
The encoder, seen in Figure 4, takes an image with
steganography as its input. The input image is then
normalized using Min-Max normalization, which scales
pixel values to the range of [0, 1]. After normalization,
the image is fed into a 2-D convolutional layer with a
kernel size of 9x9 and 64 filters, followed by a ReLU
activation [26]. The output of the convolutional layer is
then fed into a downsample block, seen in Figure 5. The
downsample block consists of two 2-D convolutional
layers with the first one having a stride of 2 which
causes the image to be downsampled by a factor of
Fig. 5: Downsample Block Architecture
Fig. 6: Residual Block Architecture
2. The use of a convolutional layer to downsample the
image is important because it allows the model to learn
the near optimal approach to downsample the image
while maintaining high image quality. The downsampled
output is then passed into 16 serial residual blocks.
The residual block architecture can be seen in Figure 6.
Following the residual blocks, a final 2-D convolutional
layer with batch normalization is added with the original
output of the downsample block in a residual manner to
form the encoded output.
2) Decoder Architecture
The decoder, seen in Figure 9, takes the output of
the encoder as its input. The input is then upsampled
using nearest interpolation with a factor of 2. This
will increase the shape of the encoder’s output back
to the size of the original input image. The upsampled
image is then fed into a 2-D convolutional layer with
a kernel size of 3x3 and 256 filters followed by a
ReLU activation. This is then fed into another 2-D
convolutional layer with a kernel size of 9x9, and 1
filter followed by a Tanh activation. Since the output
of the Tanh activation function is in the range [−1, 1],
the output is denormalized to scale the pixel values back
to the range [0, 255]. This output represents the purified
image.
3) Autoencoder Training
To train the autoencoder, steganographic images are
used as the input to the encoder. The encoder creates
the encoded image which is fed into the decoder which
decodes the image back to its original size. The decoded
image is then compared to its corresponding cover
image counterpart using the MSE loss function. The
Fig. 7: Discriminator Architecture for the DDSP
Fig. 8: Discriminator Block Architecture
Fig. 9: Decoder Network Architecture
autoencoder was trained using early stopping and was
optimized using the Adam optimizer [27] with a learning
rate α = 10−3, β1 = 0.5, and β2 = 0.9.
B. GAN Training
Similar to the SRGAN training process, we use the
pretrained model to initialize the generator network. As
seen in Figure 7, the discriminator is similar to the
SRGAN’s discriminator with the exception of DDSP’s
discriminator blocks, seen in Figure 8, which contains
the number of convolutional filters per layer in decreas-
ing order to significantly reduce the number of model
parameters which decreases training time.
To train the DDSP model, the GAN is trained by
having the generator produce purified images. These
purified images along with original cover images are
passed to the discriminator which is then optimized
to distinguish between purified and cover images. The
GAN framework was trained for 5 epochs (enough
epochs for the model to converge) to fine tune the gen-
erator to produce purified images with high frequency
detail of the original cover image more accurately.
V. RESULTS
To assess the performance of our proposed DDSP
model in comparison to other steganography removal
methods, image resizing and denoising wavelet filters,
the testing dataset was used to analyze the image pu-
rification quality of the DDSP model. Image quality
metrics in combination with visual analysis of im-
age differencing are used to provide further insight
to how each method purifies the images. Finally, the
DDSP model’s generalization abilities are analyzed by
testing the transfer learning performance of purifying
steganography embedded using different steganography
algorithms and file types.
A. Image Purification Quality
To compare the quality of the resulting purified im-
ages, the following metrics were calculated between the
purified images and their corresponding steganographic
counterpart images: Mean Squared Error (MSE), Peak
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), Structural Similarity In-
dex (SSIM) [28], and Universal Quality Index (UQI)
[29]. The MSE and PSNR metrics are point-wise mea-
surements of error while the SSIM and UQI metrics
were developed to specifically assess image quality. To
provide a quantitative measurement of the model’s dis-
tortion of the pixels to destroy steganographic content,
we utilize the bit error ratio (BER) metric, which in our
use case can be summarized as the number of bits in the
image that have changed after purification, normalized
by the total number of bits in the image.
Our proposed DDSP is then baselined against several
steganography removal or obfuscation techniques. The
first method simply employs bicubic interpolation to
downsize an image by a scale factor of 2 and then resize
the image back to its original size. As seen in Figure
10(b), the purified image using bicubic interpolation is
blurry and does not perform well with respect to main-
taining high perceptual image quality. The next baseline
method consists of denoising filters using Daubechies 1
(db1) wavelets [30] and BayesShrink thresholding [31].
An example of the resulting denoised image can be seen
in Figure 10(c). It is notable that the wavelet denoising
method is more visually capable of maintaining adequate
image quality in comparison to the bicubic resizing
method. The final baseline method we compare our
(a) Original Image (b) Bicubic Interpolation. (c) Denoising Wavelet Filter
(d) Autoencoder (e) DDSP
Fig. 10: Examples of Scrubbed Images Using Various Models
DDSP model against is using the pretrained autoencoder
prior to GAN fine tuning as the purifier. As seen in
Figure 10(d), the autoencoder does a sufficient job in
maintaining image quality while purifying the image. Fi-
nally, the resulting purified image from the DDSP can be
seen in Figure 10(e). The DDSP and the autoencoder’s
purified images have the best visual image quality, with
the wavelet filtered image having a slightly lower image
quality.
Not only does our proposed DDSP maintain very
high perceptual image quality, it is quantitatively better
image purifier based on image quality metrics. As seen
in Table I, the images purified using DDSP resulted
in the greatest performance with respect to the BER,
MSE, PSNR, SSIM and UQI metrics in comparison
to all baselined methods. Since our proposed DDSP
model resulted in the highest BER at 82%, it changed
the greatest amount of bits in the image, effectively
obfuscating the most amount of steganographic content.
Even though our proposed DDSP model changed the
highest amount of bits within each image, it produces
outputs with the highest quality as verified by the PSNR,
SSIM, and UQI metrics, indicating it is the paramount
method to use for steganography destruction.
TABLE I: Testing Results on the BossBase Dataset
Model BER MSE PSNR SSIM UQI
DDSP 0.82 5.27 40.91 0.99 0.99
Autoencoder 0.78 5.97 40.37 0.98 0.99
Wavelet Filter 0.52 6942.51 9.72 0.19 0.50
Bicubic Inter. 0.53 6767.35 9.82 0.22 0.51
B. Image Differencing
To provide additional analysis of the different image
purification models, we subtract the original cover image
from their corresponding purified images allowing for
the visualization of the effects caused by steganography
and purification. As seen in Figure 11(a), when the cover
image and the corresponding steganographic image are
differenced, the resulting image contains a lot of noise.
This is expected because the steganography algorithm
injects payloads as high frequency noise into the images.
The differenced bicubic interpolation purified image,
seen in Figure 11(b), removes the majority of noise from
the image. However, as discussed in the previous section,
the bicubic interpolation method does not maintain good
visual quality as it removes original content from the
image. As seen in Figure 11(c) and Figure 11(d), both
(a) Original Steganography (b) Bicubic Interpolation (c) Denoising Wavelet Filter
(d) Autoencoder (e) DDSP
Fig. 11: Examples of Original Image Subtracted from Using Scrubbed Image from Various Models
the denoising wavelet filter and autoencoder purifier do
not remove the noise from the image. Instead, they
both appear to inject additional noise into the image
to obfuscate the steganographic content, making it un-
usable. This is visually apparent in the noise located
in the whitespace near the top building within the
image. For both the wavelet filter and autoencoder,
this noise is visually increased in comparison to the
original steganographic image. Lastly, as seen in Figure
11(e), the DDSP model removes the noise from the
image instead of injecting additional noise. This is again
apparent in the whitespace near the top of the image. In
the DDSP’s purified image, almost all of the noise has
been removed from these areas, effectively learning to
optimally remove the steganographic pattern, which we
infer makes the DDSP have the highest image quality
in comparison to other methods.
C. Transfer Learning
Transfer learning can be described as using a applying
a model’s knowledge gained while training on a certain
task to a completely different task. To understand the
generalization capability of our model, we form exper-
iments involving the purification of images embedded
using an unseen steganography algorithm along with an
unseen image format. Additionally we test the purifi-
cation method of audio files embedded with an unseen
steganography algorithm.
1) Application to LSB Steganography
To test the generalization of the DDSP model across
unseen image steganography algorithms, we recorded
the purification performance of the BOSSBase dataset
in its original PGM file format embedded with stegano-
graphic payloads using LSB steganography [32]. The
images were embedded with real malicious payloads
generated using Metasploit’s MSFvenom payload gen-
erator [33], which is a commonly used exploitation tool.
This was done to mimic the realism of an APT hiding
malware using image steganography. Without retraining,
the LSB steganography images were purified using
the various methods. Similar to the results in Section
V-A, the DDSP model removed the greatest amount
of steganography while maintaining the highest image
quality. These results can be verified quantitatively by
looking at Table II.
D. Application to Audio Steganography
To test the generalization of DDSP across different file
formats, we additionally recorded performance metrics
on audio files embedded with the same malicious pay-
TABLE II: Transfer Learning Results on the LSB
Dataset
Model BER MSE PSNR SSIM UQI
DDSP 0.82 5.09 41.05 0.98 0.99
Autoencoder 0.78 5.63 40.62 0.98 0.99
Wavelet Filter 0.53 6935.08 9.72 0.19 0.50
Bicubic Inter. 0.53 6763.73 9.83 0.22 0.51
loads detailed in Section V-C1, using the LSB algorithm.
The audio files were from the VoxCeleb1 dataset [34],
which contains over 1000 utterances from over 12000
speakers, however we only utilized their testing dataset.
The testing dataset contains 40 speakers, and 4874
utterances. In order to use the DDSP model without re-
training for purifying the audio files, the audio files were
reshaped from vectors into matrices and then fed into
the DDSP model. The output matrices from the DDSP
model were then reshaped back to the original vector
format to recreate the audio file. After vectorization, a
butterworth lowpass filter [35] and a hanning window
filter [36] were applied to the audio file to remove the
high frequency edge artifacts created when vectorizing
the matrices. The models were baselined against a 1-
D denoising wavelet filter as well as upsampling the
temporal resolution of the audio signal using bicubic
interpolation after downsampling by a scale factor of
2. As seen in Table III, the pretrained autoencoder,
denoising wavelet filter, and DDSP are all capable of
successfully obfuscating the steganography within the
audio files without sacrificing the quality of the audio,
with respect to the BER, MSE, and PSNR metrics.
However, the upsampling using bicubic interpolation
method provides worse MSE and PSNR in comparison
to the other techniques. This shows that those models are
generalized and remove steganographic content in vari-
ous file types and steganography algorithms. Although
the wavelet denoising filter has slightly better metrics
than the DDSP and the pretrained autoencoder, we
believe that the DDSP model would greatly outperform
wavelet filtering if trained to simultaneously remove
image and audio steganography and appropriately handle
1-D signals as input.
TABLE III: Transfer Learning Results on the VoxCeleb1
Dataset
Model BER MSE PSNR
DDSP 0.67 650.12 37.28
Autoencoder 0.67 650.14 37.28
Wavelet Filter 0.67 643.94 37.65
Bicubic Inter. 0.64 1157.01 35.54
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a steganography purifica-
tion model which we term Deep Digital Steganography
Purifier (DDSP), which utilizes a Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) which, to the best of our knowledge,
removes the highest amount of steganographic content
from images while maintaining the highest visual image
quality in comparison to other state-of-the-art techniques
as verified by visual and quantitative results. In the fu-
ture, we plan to extend the DDSP model to purify inputs
of various types, sizes, and color spaces. Additionally
we plan to train the DDSP model on a larger dataset to
make the model more robust, thus making it ready to
be operationalized for a real steganography purification
system.
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